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Dignifying Madness: Rethinking 
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass 
Incarceration* 
JONATHAN SIMON* & STEPHEN A. ROSENBAUM* 
Modern nation-states have been trapped in recurring cycles 
of incarcerating and emancipating residents with psychiat-
ric disabilities. New cycles of enthusiasm for incarceration 
generally commence with well-defined claims about the evils 
of allowing “the mad” to remain at liberty and the benefits 
incarceration would bring to the afflicted. A generation or 
two later, at most, reports of terrible conditions in institu-
tions circulate and new laws follow, setting high burdens for 
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those seeking to imprison and demanding exacting legal pro-
cedures with an emphasis on individual civil liberties. To-
day, we seem to be arriving at another turn in the familiar 
cycle. A growing movement led by professionals and family 
members of people with mental health disabilities is calling 
for new laws enabling earlier and more assertive treatment. 
After reviewing the history of civil commitment law, this   es-
say suggests that the time is ripe in the United States to end 
this recurring cycle and make conservation of human dignity 
the core legal authority behind the state’s power of civil 
commitment and the major normative guide for both legal 
procedure and treatment. We conclude that the dignity ap-
proach has the potential to move the debate beyond the cur-
rent face-off between consumer and peer advocates, who 
wish to avoid any revision of the civil commitment reforms 
enacted forty years ago, and families and professionals, who 
favor significant changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the “Great Confinement” of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries,1 modern nation-states have been trapped in recur-
ring cycles of incarcerating and emancipating residents with symp-
tomatic psychiatric disabilities. New cycles of enthusiasm for incar-
ceration generally commence with well-defined claims about the 
evils of allowing the mad to remain at liberty and the benefits incar-
ceration would bring to those afflicted. A generation or two later, at 
most, reports of terrible conditions in institutions circulate and new 
laws follow, setting high burdens for those seeking to incarcerate the 
mad and demanding exacting legal procedures. The cycle begins 
again as a new group of reformers argue that people with psychiatric 
disabilities have been abandoned to even worse forms of incarcera-
tion than the asylums from which they were emancipated. 
We use the admittedly archaic terms “mad” and “madness”—
along with the more acceptable “people with mental illness” or “per-
sons with psychiatric disabilities”—as a way of shaking up the cat-
egories that have shaped our most recent cycles.2  It is important to 
                                                                                                             
 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS 44 (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan 
Murphy & Jean Khalfa trans., Routledge 2006) (1961). 
 2 The line dividing acceptable terminology from unacceptable can be blurry. 
No matter what term we employ, there is virtual disagreement amongst consum-
ers, advocates and other professionals. See e.g., Charles O’Mahony, The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Abolition 
of the Insanity Defense 6 (unpublished paper) (on file with authors) (citing “mad” 
and “crazy” as politically incorrect terms which nonetheless reclaim the stigma). 
On the linguistic politics, see, e.g, Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Hammerin’ Hank: The 
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bear in mind that we use those terms not to describe people, or ill-
nesses of the mind, but those social situations in which people with 
mental illness find themselves caught up in homelessness, drug 
abuse or crime victimization. Or else, they become a subject of po-
lice concern or (in the eyes of their families or neighbors) are at risk 
of becoming the subject of police concern, and they end up incar-
cerated.3 
After reviewing the history of civil commitment law, this essay 
takes up the foundations for the dignity approach and its core prin-
ciples. We conclude that the dignity approach has the potential to 
move the debate beyond the current face-off between consumer ad-
vocates who wish to avoid any revision of the civil commitment re-
forms enacted forty years ago and families who favor significant 
changes. 
I. HISTORY OF ASYLUMS 
Prior to the sixteenth century, the mad, along with other catego-
ries of the nomadic poor, were tolerated in varying degrees or they 
were abandoned and ignored—at least within European societies.4 
They were perceived as curiosities, objects of charity and signs of 
divine or satanic powers—a focus for family and religious control, 
rather than the state (Figures 1 and 2). By the middle of the seven-
teenth century, the presence of the mad in public was taken to be a 
direct threat to public health. Institutions to confine them, along with 
                                                                                                             
Right to be Raunchy or FM Freak Show?, 23 Disability Studies Qtrly, nn. 51–57 
(2003), http://www.brandeis.edu/lemberg/SGHL/DSQ.html (discussing the re-
claiming of outmoded identity terms and epithets). But see Richard Fung, Looking 
for My Penis: The Eroticized Asian in Gay Porn, in How Do I Look? Queer Film 
and Video 168, n.8 (1991) (Bad-Object Choices, eds.) (“too much time spent on 
the politics of ‘naming’ can in the end be diversionary”). 
 3 See Pfeiffer, infra note 33. By using “subject of police concern,” we delib-
erately avoid the invocation of a particular standard for dangerousness or other 
justification for officer intervention. 
 4 FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 48, 53 (describing the terms of the establish-
ment by royal decree in 1656 Paris’s Hôpital General consolidating the city’s 
existing institutions for confinement and relief under the King’s authority and 
with substantial investment from the Crown). 
2015] DIGNIFYING MADNESS 5 
 
other disconnected and troubled individuals, were viewed as requi-
site to the sovereignty of emerging nation-states.5  Within a century 
and a half, reformers throughout Europe, such as John Howard in 
England and Philippe Pinel in France, would decry this carceral ar-
chipelago, especially the cruelty of confining the mad without treat-
ment (Figures 4 and 5).6 
 
Fig. 1 Heronymous Bosch, “Ship of Fools” (1490). 
                                                                                                             
 5 In 1575, for example, Elizabeth I’s Parliament enacted a law ordering the 
construction of poor houses for “the punishment of vagabonds and the relief of 
the poor” beginning the spread of all sorts of small jails and houses of corrections 
in England and Wales. See JOHN PORTER, HISTORY OF THE FYLDE OF LANCASHIRE 
476 (1876). 
 6 The asylum movement of the nineteenth and twentieth century was in-
formed by a more scientific categorization of madness and carefully distinguished 
between the mad, criminals, and the indigent, assigning them to distinct institu-
tions (hospital, prison, and workhouse), but the scale of confinement actually 
grew. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: 
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1st ed. 1971). 
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Fig. 2 Hieronymous Bosch, “The Cure of Folly: Extraction of 
the Stone of Madness” (1475-1480). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Pieter Breughel, “Mad Meg” (1563). 
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Fig. 4 Francisco Goya, “Yard with Mad Men” (1794) 
 
Fig. 5 Tony Robert-Fleury, “Pinel Liberating the Madwomen 
of the Salpetrière” (1795) 
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Today, we seem to be arriving at another turn in the familiar cy-
cle. In the United States, where the first asylums for people with 
psychiatric disabilities were built in the early ninteenth century and 
revitalized in the early twentieth century,7 we now seem poised to 
begin our third cycle. A growing movement led by professionals and 
family members of people with psychiatric disabilities is calling for 
new laws enabling earlier and more assertive treatment. The new 
reformers are pointing to unprecedented numbers of mentally ill 
people in jails and prisons, citing alarming reports of armed assaults 
by people with known psychiatric disabilities that have gone un-
treated—like Jared Loughner, who shot Representative Gabriel 
Gifford in Arizona in 2010—and citing the benefits of a newer gen-
eration of psychiatric treatment drugs.8 In this essay, we suggest that 
the time is ripe in the United States to end this recurring cycle of 
incarceration and emancipation. It is time to make conservation of 
human dignity the core legal authority behind the state’s power of 
civil commitment and the major normative guide for both legal pro-
cedure and treatment. 
Historically, incarceration of people with psychiatric disabilities 
has been based on one or two historic powers of the modern state, 
inherited from its monarchical ancestors. One is parens patriae, the 
state’s power to protect citizens and residents against death or injury 
when they have become disabled and are unable to care for them-
selves and their affairs.9 The second is the state’s power to protect 
                                                                                                             
 7 See Patricia D’Antonio, History of Psychiatric Hospitals, http://www.nurs-
ing.upenn.edu/nhhc/Pages/HistoryofPsychiatricHospitals.aspx (last visited Aug. 
19, 2015). 
 8 For example, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), an advo-
cacy organization for families of people with mental illness that supports signifi-
cant reform of civil commitment laws, states the following in the opening lines of 
one of its online publications: “Since 1990, remarkably effective medications 
have become available for the treatment of mental illnesses. The introduction of 
these medications represents an unprecedented turning point for the more than 
five million Americans who have severe mental illnesses and for their families.” 
Access to Effective Medications: A Critical Link to Mental Illness Recovery, 
NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www2.nami.org/Content/Content-
Groups/E-News/20003/July_20002/Access_to_Effective_Medications__A_Crit-
ical_Link_to_Mental_Illness_Recovery1.htm (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 9 Parens patriae invokes the historical concept that the sovereign is literally 
“a father” to the people of the land. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 42 (2005); see Jonathan Simon, Power 
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its citizens or residents against violent assaults from others, typically 
called the state’s “police power.”10 Modern civil commitment law is 
based on both powers. After the last pro-emancipation reform turn 
of the cycle in the 1970s, most states established parallel standards 
that protect persons against incarceration based on symptoms of 
psychiatric disability alone. In addition to evidence of that disability, 
the state must show they are too disabled to care for themselves or 
are a danger to themselves or others.11 The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that protecting human dignity is an independ-
ent basis for state power that informs and goes beyond the exercise 
of parens patriae or police powers. A careful reading of past prece-
dents12 and the Court’s most recent decision on the rights of people 
with serious mental illness13 suggest that revised mental health 
codes do pass constitutional muster. These decisions embrace the 
principles of a “dignity-based” approach to civil commitment. 
Dignity as a legal value has long animated movements to reform 
treatment of people with psychiatric disabilities and was at the core 
of the last wave of reform laws in the 1970s, which largely favored 
emancipation.14 The concept has evolved rapidly in recent decades. 
                                                                                                             
Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1363, 1367 (1995). 
 10 WINICK, supra note 9, at 42. 
 11 See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 15 (1996) (explaining that the government’s power 
includes both “powers to shield vulnerable citizens from harm and to protect so-
ciety from danger”); see also id. at 26–30 (characterizing most states as adopting 
an imminent dangerousness standard). 
 12 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972) (holding that “Indiana cannot 
constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period simply on account 
of his incompetency to stand trial . . .”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
574–75 (1975) (explaining that mental illness, without more, is an insufficient 
ground for confining a person who is not a danger to herself or others); see Ziner-
mon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 123, 138 (1990) (explaining the need for informed 
consent for voluntary admission to mental hospitals); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 84–86 (1992) (holding that a “[s]tate must have a particularly convincing 
reason . . . for [] discriminat[ing] against insanity acquittees who are no longer 
mentally ill”). 
 13 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that a state may 
deny a defendant her right to self-representation at trial if doing so under condi-
tions of mental illness would place her dignity at risk). 
 14 As one advocate put it, “[d]einstitutionalization will have accomplished a 
tremendous amount if the mentally ill can live lives of dignity and a reasonable 
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The first wave of international human rights law, following World 
War II, was based on dignity, was focused on civil and political 
rights associated with equality and autonomy, the so-called “nega-
tive liberties.”15 In more recent decades, human rights law has 
moved towards a concern with the full range of conditions that ena-
ble a recognizably human existence. These social, economic, and 
cultural rights include treatment of the body and mind, and the pro-
cesses of suffering, disease and mortality.16 
These norms find confirmation in empirically developed in-
sights on the therapeutic effects of legal procedures.17 Moreover, de-
velopments in the jurisprudential context of civil commitment have 
become even more urgent and practical due to a sweeping change in 
the social context of civil commitment. When the last major wave 
of civil commitment law reform swept the country, prison popula-
tion was at a twentieth-century low, as official crime policy contin-
ued to shift away from imprisonment as a tool of crime control.18 
Meanwhile, state mental hospitals—the major place for incarcera-
tion of people with psychiatric disabilities—were in the midst of de-
institutionalization, a population reduction that had begun a decade 
earlier and was accelerating.19 In recent memory, these hospitals had 
                                                                                                             
amount of comfort in the community . . . .” H. Richard Lamb, What Did We Really 
Expect From Deinstitutionalization?, 32 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 105 
(1981). Another example is found in Robert K. Patch, The Mentally Disabled and 
His Lawyer, 2 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 34 (1974) (describing mentally disabled 
people as being denied their dignity). 
 15 See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
75, 77–78 (2007) (describing “negative rights” as the dominant focus of early hu-
man rights work); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND 
IDOLATRY 56–57 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) (explaining that “human rights is 
only a systematic agenda of ‘negative liberty’”). 
 16 See Stein, supra note 15, at 78 (describing a second generation of rights 
focused on social and cultural needs). 
 17 WINICK, supra note 9, at 47; see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 6–7 (2006). 
 18 JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN & STEVE REDBURN, THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 3 (2014) (ebook) (explaining that growth in incarceration began 
in the early 1970s). 
 19 PHIL BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYCHIATRIC 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 47 (1985) (noting a rapid decline 
between 1955 and 1971 in the percentage of psychiatric episodes that were treated 
in state hospitals). 
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operated much like prisons without rehabilitation or release dates.20 
Indeed, the most significant goal of reform was to place significant 
and repeated legal obstacles in the path of further incarceration of 
people with psychiatric disabilities who posed no significant risk to 
themselves or others and who could receive more effective treat-
ment in the community.21 
In the intervening forty years, a revolution in criminal justice 
policies led to an enormous expansion of the prison population. As 
prison sentences became less individualized through a variety of 
mechanisms—including determinate sentences, mandatory mini-
mums, and prosecutorial discretion—unprecedented numbers of 
people with serious mental illness found themselves confined in 
prisons and jails.22 For a long time this problem was largely invisi-
ble, but, since the 1990s, a growing tide of evidence and litigation 
has focused attention on the fact that jails and prisons have become 
the new mental hospitals. In California, more than a quarter of pris-
oners are diagnosed with a major mental illness.23 The conditions 
facing these prisoners have been especially horrific because prisons 
have lost what little capacity for individualized surveillance and care 
they once had. These prisons were built to maximize the size of the 
confined population and have not emphasized treatment, education, 
or training.24 In one of the strongest prisoner-rights decisions in a 
generation, a narrow majority of the United States Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
 20 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569, 576 (describing the 
hospital where Donaldson was confined for fifteen years as a “simple regime of 
enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed 
illness”). 
 21 WINICK, supra note 9, at 2. 
 22 See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., 
MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A 
SURVEY OF THE STATES 1 (2010) (finding that, as of 2005, there were “more than 
three times more seriously mentally ill people in jails and prisons than in hospi-
tals”). 
 23 Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1074 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
 24 See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A 
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 11 
(2014) (discussing California’s prison system and the “zero-sum contest between 
the dignity of prisoners and public safety, which promoted deliberate indifference 
to the needs of prisoners, from physical and mental health care needs to the need 
for decent accommodation free from overcrowding and other forms of cruel and 
unusual punishment”). 
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recently upheld a gargantuan prison population reduction order 
against California.25 The Court focused on the fate of prisoners with 
serious psychiatric disabilities, which was extensively documented 
in the record.26 Since then, there has been growing recognition of 
the cruelty of imprisoning people with severe psychiatric disabili-
ties.27 This recognition provides common ground between consum-
ers or survivors of psychiatric medicine, who view any increase in 
coercion as a setback from the gains achieved in the last period of 
reform28 and family members, who have in recent years advocated 
for more intervention-friendly laws.29 
The way to build on that common ground is with a dignity-based 
approach to civil commitment law, informed by contemporary de-
                                                                                                             
 25 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1928–29 (2011) (holding that prison 
conditions that deny human dignity, including the failure to provide adequate 
medical and mental health care, violated the Eight Amendment). 
 26 Id. The order required the state to reduce its chronic hyper-incarceration 
from nearly 200% of its prisons’ design capacity to a mere 137.5% of design ca-
pacity within two years. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–24, 1928. 
 27 See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Mass Imprisonment: From Social Policy to So-
cial Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 23, 
23–52 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012); Jennifer L. Skeem & Jillian 
K. Peterson, Identifying, Treating, and Reducing Risk for Offenders with Mental 
Illness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra, at 
521 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds., 2012); Craig Haney, The Psycholog-
ical Effects of Imprisonment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS, supra, at 584 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
 28 Michael Rembis, The New Asylums: Madness and Mass Incarceration in 
the Neoliberal Era, in DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND 
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 139, 152 (Liat Ben-Moshe et al. 
eds., 2014) (describing the work of mental health survivors and “mad activists,” 
who are concerned about mass incarceration but wary about expanding treatment 
powers). 
 29 See E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S 
FAILURE TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 128 
(2008) (noting a “massive increase in the number of mentally ill persons in jails 
and prisons” as a “consequence of emptying public psychiatric hospitals and then 
passing laws that prevent the treatment of individuals after their release”); MARY 
BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR 
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL xiii (2007) (describing the more than 300,000 peo-
ple with mental illnesses in prisons and jails as a major reason to reform the sys-
tem for involuntary treatment). 
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velopments in disability human rights and therapeutic jurispru-
dence. In this essay we discuss three core principles that could pro-
vide a way out of the cycles of incarceration and emancipation.30 
A. Narrative Autonomy 
A dignified approach requires that those subject to commitment 
proceedings be treated as persons whose own narrative is given spe-
cific and genuine consideration throughout the legal process itself 
and in any clinical treatment process that follows. This should be the 
approach notwithstanding the gravity of their disease. One way of 
conceptualizing this principle is to observe that civil commitment 
temporarily separates the narrative side of human dignity from the 
executive, or decision-making side, but leaves the former intact. The 
suspension of executive autonomy is a harsh blow to human dignity 
and should be done with great reluctance. But, it should never mean 
a suspension of narrative autonomy. Indeed, the more decision-mak-
ing autonomy is impeded, the more closely and sincerely narrative 
autonomy should be honored.31 
B. Minimization of Incarceration 
The second core principle is for courts to minimize the chance 
and severity of incarceration, while being mindful of the high risks 
confinement poses to the dignity and health of people with psychi-
atric disabilities. Under the parens patriae or police power theo-
ries,32 persons who are not an immediate existential threat to them-
selves or another, should not be incarcerated for treatment under this 
                                                                                                             
 30 We make no claim of originality here; these principles are well established 
in both human rights law and therapeutic jurisprudence. Our contribution is stra-
tegic: we suggest how a reform agenda can take up and build support for these 
principles. 
 31 In Germany (and other European countries), where dignity has formed the 
core value behind an elaboration of rules for prisons and psychiatric hospitals, 
inmates must be addressed by formal name and with the honorific title used com-
monly to address a citizen. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 8 
(2003). 
 32 Most states couple this with the closely related form of conservatorship, 
which is typically applied when persons with mental illness are unable to care for 
themselves sufficiently to assure survival. It is different than a threat to self posed 
in civil commitment, which amounts to a suicide risk. 
14 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
dignity-based principle. In a society where harsh penal laws and un-
compromising policing make it highly likely that many of the most 
marginal and vulnerable people will end up detained largely as a 
result of their disabilities, the state must minimize detention. It must 
also assure that access to treatment is guaranteed and that the length 
of incarceration is limited. 
When the last wave of civil commitment reform took place, the 
potential for hospitals to become places of long-term or permanent 
exclusion from the community remained fresh in memory and often 
a real threat. Today, incarceration through civil commitment has di-
minished to the point where it is dwarfed by the number of those 
with psychiatric disabilities who inhabit prisons and jails.33 When 
hospitalization is ordered, the pressure of institutional incentives, 
primarily economic incentives, favors early release.34 Few efforts 
are made to re-imprison those who might relapse until they do.35 In 
contrast, penal incarceration through criminalization has become 
routine to the point of social normality in some communities.36 
When it does occur, extended prison terms have become common-
place, and powerful institutional incentives favoring recidivism 
make re-incarceration highly likely.37 
C. Progressivity 
Third, we advocate an approach to civil commitment that recog-
nizes that incarceration is inherently damaging and becomes moreso 
with time. The damage is compounded when there is evidence that 
incarceration is achieving little positive effect. Even when based on 
                                                                                                             
 33 TORREY, supra note 29, at 2, 129 (noting that there were approximately 
40,000 Americans in public mental hospitals in 2006, as opposed to an estimated 
218,600 seriously mentally ill prisoners in mid-2005). 
 34 PAUL R. LINDE, DANGER TO SELF: ON THE FRONT LINE WITH AN ER 
PSYCHIATRIST 101–02 (2010) (ebook) (describing the legal and insurance pres-
sures on psychiatrists to release patients from involuntary treatment quickly). 
 35 Id. at 103 (observing the “revolving door” between release and relapse). 
 36 TRAVIS, supra note 18, at 68 (observing that, “[a]mong recent cohorts of 
African American men, 70 percent of those who dropped out of [high] school 
served time in state or federal prison”). 
 37 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY 139–41 (2003) (documenting high recidivism rates associated with pol-
icies that favor simple custody over the development of rehabilitative programs 
in prison or re-entry programs for released prisoners). 
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criminal behavior, prison sentences violate the Eighth Amendment 
when they continue past the point where further incarceration will 
deepen the prisoner’s psychiatric disabilities.38 States have an af-
firmative obligation to protect the human dignity of their residents 
by developing prosecution and sentencing policies that prevent the 
state from imprisoning people with psychiatric disabilities, espe-
cially for prolonged periods. These three principles have broad sup-
port in contemporary human rights law and in academic research on 
therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural justice. They form the core 
of a dignified civil commitment regime that aims to prevent cycles 
of over-incarceration. They also form a practical framework for ad-
vancing common ground between multiple stakeholders. 
II. CYCLES OF INCARCERATION AND EMANCIPATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Since this country’s independence, we have witnessed two com-
plete turns of this cycle. The first began as Americans in the early 
Republic responded to the wrenching social transformations un-
leashed by the Revolution. They embraced “asylums” as the so-
called new total institutions dedicated to the care of people with psy-
chiatric disabilities.39 By the Civil War, however, the failure of sig-
nificant new treatments to emerge, and gross underinvestment in op-
erating these total institutions, led to a public scandal over inhumane 
treatment and unnecessary confinement in horrible conditions. 
Many elites were convinced that new laws should zealously guard 
the citizen against involuntary commitment.40 
Enthusiasm for incarceration returned at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Asylums, now rebranded with terms like “psychopathic 
                                                                                                             
 38 See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1244–45, 1258–59 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 39 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC xiv (1st ed. 1971). 
 40 Id. at 242–43. 
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hospital,” were once again seen as an instrument of social improve-
ment.41 Although reformers were venerated as liberators who un-
bound the mad, they sought less to eliminate confinement than to 
reinvent it in new, more medically effective forms. Virtually every 
state built public hospitals in the nineteenth century and expanded 
them into multi-hospital systems in the twentieth century.42 The lat-
ter wave was inspired, in large part, by new concerns for the conse-
quences of eugenics. This was part of the broader reaction to mass 
immigration, but it cast in a new light the danger of allowing the 
mentally and morally defective to remain free.43 
Concerns over the fate of impoverished laborers living in cities 
swollen with uneducated immigrants displaced an earlier genera-
tion’s concerns about over-incarceration without due process.44 
“Progressives” saw expert-guided administrative discretion as the 
key to addressing many of the social problems of this class. They 
enacted laws from World War I through the Great Depression aimed 
at making it easier to imprison individuals believed to be psychiat-
rically disabled or “defective” with a minimum of legal oversight.45 
Despite the promise of more effective short-term hospitalization, 
the long-term hospitalized population expanded to unprecedented 
levels, peaking in 1955.46 Their poor conditions became a major fo-
cus of investigative journalists and political reformers.47 
This set the scene for the close of the second cycle. Animated by 
evidence that the enlarged hospital system was failing to provide 
either treatment or humane conditions, and by the post-War concern 
with human rights and civil liberties, reformers went to both courts 
and state legislatures. They sought to enact new laws protecting peo-
ple with mental illness against incarceration. This culminated in key 
                                                                                                             
 41 See generally IAN ROBERT DOWBIGGIN, KEEPING AMERICA SANE: 
PSYCHIATRY AND EUGENICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1880 TO 1940 
(Cornell University Press, 1997). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 
HARV. L. REV. 302, 311 (1913). 
 45 DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS: 
BRINGING THE MENTALLY DISABLED INTO THE COMMUNITY 4 (2005). 
 46 WINICK, supra note 9, at 2. 
 47 PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 210–14 (1994). 
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judicial precedents and new statutes from 1965 to 1980.48 It took at 
least a decade for new statutes to generate new practice norms and 
routines. 
The jurisprudence that emerged limited confinement to situa-
tions in which the state presents evidence of imminent danger.49 The 
Supreme Court held that incarcerating people who are not a threat 
to themselves or others, and who are not receiving treatment, vio-
lates their right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.50 Although this leaves room under the constitutional 
limit for incarcerating people with psychiatric disabilities who are 
actually receiving treatment, most states have further limited con-
finement by adopting “danger to self or others” or “grave disability” 
(defined as incapable of self-care or life sustaining activities) stand-
ards as the limit on civil commitment authority.51 
California’s reform statute became a model for the highly anti-
carcereal approach to civil commitment law.52 The state followed 
the nation in the two cycles of incarceration and emancipation de-
scribed above, but in a characteristically extreme version.53 When 
the state was founded in 1851, California embraced with fervor the 
                                                                                                             
 48 See ANDREW T. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND 
THE DEVIANT—A RADICAL VIEW 41–58 (2d ed. 1984); BROWN, supra note 19, at 
29 (noting that “war had prevented much attention [from] being given to asylum 
conditions, but in the postwar period impetus was provided by journalists’ expo-
sés of the hospitals and by lobbying efforts of the mental health professions which 
had expanded in wartime service”); RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, 
MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE 
MENTALLY ILL 109, 125 (1990). 
 49 See TORREY, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing the origin of the dangerous-
ness standard). 
 50 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (holding that “Indiana’s 
indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompe-
tency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of due process”). 
 51 WINICK, supra note 9, at 42. 
 52 APPELBAUM, supra note 47, at 26–27. 
 53 California has been at the forefront of most important social, political, and 
economic trends since at least the beginning of the twentieth century. See KEVIN 
STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
199 (1985). 
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asylum project initiated half a century earlier in the Northeast, build-
ing state hospitals on an unprecedented basis.54 While advocates 
“back East” emphasized the asylum’s aspirations for treatment, Cal-
ifornia embraced the asylum largely as a mechanism to segregate a 
segment of the population viewed as dangerous, or at least burden-
some.55 
Waves of domestic migrants arriving from the East, along with 
Mexican and Asian immigrants, led to a deficit in social trust and 
solidarity.56 This dynamic demography made the state’s voters 
prone to anxiety about deviance of all sorts.57 At the same time, Cal-
ifornians’ progressive confidence in the ability of government to 
solve problems with science and technology must have made the 
mental hospital highly attractive, with its aura of medical treatment. 
By the time professional and public opinion began turning against 
hospitals in the 1950s, California had one of the highest involuntary 
hospitalization rates in the nation58 and a troubling history of human 
rights abuses, including forced sterilization of patients.59 The back-
lash was particularly strong, and the state established an early and 
influential approach that would define the extreme wing of the anti-
hospitalization trend. The Lanterman Petris Short Act (LPS Act), 
adopted in 1969, established a new substantive legal standard for 
coerced treatment or hospitalization.60 No longer would a diagnosis 
of mental illness and a doctor’s judgment that an individual would 
                                                                                                             
 54 RICHARD W. FOX, SO FAR DISORDERED IN MIND: INSANITY IN 
CALIFORNIA, 1870–1930 17–18, 42 (1978). 
 55 Id. at 17 (explaining that “[f]rom their very beginnings in the 1850s they 
were clearly understood to be not simply treatment facilities for the mentally dis-
turbed, but also detention facilities for ‘imbeciles, dotards, idiots, drunkards, sim-
pletons, fools,’ for the ‘aged, the vagabond, the helpless[]’”). 
 56 David Ward, Population Growth, Migration, and Urbanization, 1860-
1920, in NORTH AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF A CHANGING 
CONTINENT 292 (Thomas F. McIlwraith & Edward K. Muller eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 57 See generally JOAN DIDION, WHERE I WAS FROM 106–07, 171–73 (2003). 
 58 FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S 
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 206 (1997). 
 59 DIDION, supra note 57, at 194; TORREY, supra note 58, at 82. 
 60 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West 2015). 
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benefit from treatment suffice. Only when persons with mental ill-
ness pose a threat to themselves or others or are shown to be 
“gravely disabled” may a court order hospitalization or treatment.61 
Under LPS, police have the authority to arrest someone they 
have probable cause to believe meets the dangerousness or grave 
disability standard as a result of a psychiatric emergency.62 They 
may take that person to a hospital where psychiatric professionals 
have up to 72 hours to evaluate the person.63 Confinement for treat-
ment after that is generally limited to periods of no more than 14 
days based on an ongoing assessment that the person is a threat to 
self or others.64 Those who meet the grave disability criteria can be 
incarcerated for longer periods, up to 180 days.65 Both these forms 
of extended detention and treatment must be approved by a hearing 
officer at which the detained individual is entitled to be present and 
represented.66 
Since the late 1990s, growing recognition of the failure of com-
munity treatment programs to become widely available has led to a 
movement for legal reforms permitting earlier treatment, if not eas-
ier incarceration.67 This recognition has been punctuated by highly 
publicized, albeit rare, instances of sudden violence against 
                                                                                                             
 61 Id. § 5250. In addition to the new standards, LPS imposed a strict time line. 
A person could be held on an emergency basis for up to seventy-two hours for 
evaluation. Following that, if medical professionals found that the person contin-
ued to pose an imminent threat of violence they could authorize another fourteen 
days of custody, an order which could be renewed once for a total of twenty-eight 
days. After the first fourteen days the law requires a court to consider whether the 
standard is met, and the patient can seek an earlier review through a writ of habeas 
corpus. LPS represents the most restrictive of the legal standards adopted by states 
in the 1970s under the prod of Supreme Court decisions holding the older permis-
sive admission standards unconstitutional. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 
730 (1972); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
 62 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2015); see A.B.A., ABA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-2.1 (1989). 
 63 Id. 
 64 WELF. & INST. § 5250; see 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 17:16, Westlaw 
(database updated May 2015). 
 65 WELF. & INST. §§ 5008, 5300; see 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 17:16, su-
pra note 64. 
 66 WELF. & INST. §§ 5275, 5276. 
 67 John Petrila & Annette Christy, Florida’s Outpatient Commitment Law: A 
Lesson in Failed Reform?, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 21, 21–23 (2008). 
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strangers by mentally ill individuals.68 A number of states have 
adopted laws allowing forms of “outpatient treatment,” which pro-
vide a legal mandate to supervise and provide treatment to a person 
with a psychiatric disability whose symptoms are becoming alarm-
ing but do not necessarily meet the LPS or similar civil commitment 
standards.69 These laws attempt to use the promise of supportive ser-
vices in the community and the threat of time-limited emergency 
incarceration for evaluation, to persuade reluctant patients to resume 
a treatment strategy that will be overseen by state professionals.70 
Empirical research on the most extensive outpatient commitment 
system, New York’s “Kendra’s Law,” 71 suggests that participants 
have lower rates of return hospitalizations.72 
                                                                                                             
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see §§ 5349, 5150; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2013); 
WELF. & INST. § 5150 (AB 1421) (2002). The primary justification for this form 
of treatment is that the population, which the law targets, is currently suffering the 
consequences of a critical gap in services between voluntary programs and invol-
untary commitment. See, e.g., Mental Health: Involuntary Treatment: Hearing on 
AB 1421 Before the S. Health and Human Serv.’s Comm., 2002 Legis., 2001-2002 
Sess. 9 (Cal. 2002) (statement of Helen Thomson), 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1401-
1450/ab_1421_cfa_20020621_100959_sen_comm.html. Professor Elyn Saks ar-
gues that individuals may not realize the benefits of consistent medication until 
they have the opportunity to experience its benefits over time, an opportunity that 
assisted outpatient treatment orders can provide. Elyn R. Saks, Involuntary Out-
patient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 94 (2003). Whether referred 
to as “assisted” or “involuntary,” outpatient treatment tends to reflect one’s sup-
port or opposition. Opponents usually stress the involuntary aspect or commit-
ment, whereas proponents prefer the kinder, gentler assisted treatment. 
 70 WELF. & INST. § 5150. 
 71 Id. It is noteworthy that in both New York and California the outpatient 
commitment laws are named after victims of lethal assaults by mentally ill indi-
viduals, “Kendra’s Law” (N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60) and “Laura’s Law” 
(WELF. & INST. § 5345) respectively. See An Explanation of Kendra’s Law, 
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/Ken-
dra_web/Ksummary.htm (last visited August 4, 2015); Laura’s Law, TREATMENT 
ADVOC. CTR., http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/lauras-law (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2015).  
 72 John Petrila, M. Susan Ridgely & Randy Borum, Debating Outpatient 
Commitment: Controversy, Trends, and Empirical Data, 49 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 157, 161–62 (2003). 
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However, it is not clear that outpatient commitment laws add 
new powers not already present under the prevailing civil commit-
ment regime.73 Most contemporary laws already favor outpatient 
treatment when it is clinically effective as a matter of using the least 
intrusive means to effectuate the state interest.74 Thus, if outpatient 
commitment laws leave in place the existing legal standards for civil 
commitment, they seem to offer little promise of preventing over-
incarceration. If, however, these laws are intended to change the 
standard to one that is more facilitative of coercive treatment, they 
leave that standard implicit and subject to arbitrary and uncertain 
application.75 
III. A DIGNITY APPROACH TO CIVIL COMMITMENT 
While dignity has been treated as a central topic in both moral 
philosophy and theology, it is perhaps in law that reference to the 
modern conception of dignity has been most significant in our 
time.76 Long limited to issues arising from special status holders like 
judges or government officials, dignity has been given a universal 
endorsement by post-World War II human rights laws, as noted 
above. Despite not appearing in the text of the U.S. Constitution, 
dignity has also long figured into the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the United States Supreme Court, especially in the last decade.77 
                                                                                                             
 73 This was the late Bruce Winick’s objection to outpatient commitment laws. 
See WINICK, supra note 9, at 42, 47. 
 74 See id.; John D. Cameron, Balancing the Interests: The Move Towards Less 
Restrictive Commitment of New York’s Mentally Ill, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 91, 92 (1988). 
 75 Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment 
Law: Kendra’s Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 183, 196–99 
(2003) (listing many unanswered questions about Kendra’s Law). 
 76 JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13 (Meir Dan-Cohen 
ed., 2012). 
 77 See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 169, 171–72 (2011) (noting an increasing prominence of dignity in the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence and a shift in location from dissenting opinions to 
majority opinions and from the Court’s most liberal members to some of its most 
conservative). 
22 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
The concept of dignity shaping modern law has its roots in two 
traditions of the ancient world.78 According to Biblical sources of 
the Abrahamic religions, human beings are envisioned as embody-
ing an essential and inalienable dignity.79 This is derived from their 
special place in creation, i.e. created in God’s image (b’tzelem Elo-
him or imago Dei).80 A second conception of dignity emerges from 
Greek and Roman conceptions of the legal meaning of noble sta-
tus.81 High-status male individuals were endowed with dignity.82 
This quality was strictly limited to the elite class, and was not so 
much earned, as it was reflected in virtuous conduct.83 Over time, 
this high-status meaning of dignity has been extended to whole pop-
ulations through mechanisms like universal national citizenship and 
human rights treaties, albeit with uneven results.84 
In his recent work, legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has ar-
gued that, despite their contradictions, the Greco-Roman concept of 
honor and the Judeo-Christian concept of equal relationship to the 
divine have merged into modern legal concepts of dignity.85 Of 
course, not all of the privileges once accorded to high-status indi-
viduals have survived in the development of the modern rights and 
privileges of citizenship. However, those that have survived apply 
to all of us.86 
                                                                                                             
 78 WALDRON, supra note 76, at 30–32 (explaining how the Roman-Greek 
conception of dignity was not so much superseded as transvalued by the Judeo-
Christian conception). 
 79 Nora Jacobson, Dignity and Health: A Review, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 292, 
293 (2007); Margit Cohen & Dieter Grimm, Human Dignity as a Constitutional 
Doctrine, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 193, 193 
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Jacobson, supra note 79, at 293; Cohen & Grimm, supra note 79, at 193. 
 82 Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, Human Rights, 
and Human Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 661, 666–67 (1998). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation 
of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 660 (2008); Jeremy Waldron, Citizen-
ship and Dignity 8–13 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-74, 2013), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2196079. 
 85 WALDRON, supra note 76, at 14. 
 86 Waldron frames the project of refining the legal meaning of dignity as “ex-
press[ing] the idea of the high and equal rank of every human person . . . we should 
look first at the bodies of law that relate status to rank (and to right and privilege) 
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“Liberty as Dignity” also stems from Greek and Roman sources, 
particularly Cicero, who was among the first philosophers to rely on 
the concept, which he tied to rationality.87 The connection between 
rationality, liberty, and dignity was at the heart of the most influen-
tial modern philosophical treatment of dignity: the works of Imman-
uel Kant.88 
While dignity has thus far had “minimal direct application to the 
rights of persons with mental disabilities”89 in the United States, the 
exponential increase in the frequency of criminal sentencing has cre-
ated conditions of widespread degradation that urgently require a 
new approach. Confinement of the mad in jails and prisons is part 
of a much broader trend that caused the overall level of imprison-
ment in the U.S. to increase more than five-fold between the 1970s 
                                                                                                             
and see what if anything is retained of these ancient conceptions when dignity is 
put to work in a new and egalitarian environment.” Id. 
 87 See David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Massimo Renzo et al. eds., 
forthcoming), at 19–20. 
 88 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17–
18 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (1785) (noting the relationship between ra-
tionality and dignity in man). Kant’s work on dignity has been influentially inter-
preted by the contemporary U.S. philosopher Alan Gewirth. See Alan Gewirth, 
Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN 
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 11 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent 
eds., 1992) (recognizing how Kant connected human rights, one’s duty to others, 
and dignity). 
 89 Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with 
Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights 
Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20, 33 (2004). 
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and the first decade of this century.90 Sociologists describe this pro-
cess as “mass imprisonment” or “mass incarceration.”91 
Critics dismiss dignity as a legal concept on the ground that it is 
too indeterminate and subjective to provide judgments or even guid-
ance to judges and other legal interpreters.92 Some defenders of dig-
nity would seek to narrow its application to norms that moral phi-
losophers can demonstrate with rigorous analysis.93 These truly uni-
versal human norms would be products of pure reason, rather than 
culturally or historically specific standards.94  On the other hand, we 
adopt the alternative approach—the pragmatist approach—that sees 
dignity as enhanced and made more objective by historical con-
text.95 
A human rights pragmatist, on the other hand, insists 
that the meaning of the phrase ‘human dignity’ is not 
defined by a philosophical theory, but rather deter-
mined by its use in human rights practice. In a sense, 
                                                                                                             
 90 There was no direct conversion of the hospitalized population to prison. 
Indeed, during the first half of the 1970s, both mental hospitals and prisons saw 
their populations dropping. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM 
KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN 
CALIFORNIA 155 (2001). It was in the 1980s that new policies, promoted by pros-
ecutors and law enforcement and embraced by California’s tough-on-crime gov-
ernor, George Deukmeijian, began to change sentencing policies that in previous 
decades would have kept many people with untreated mental illness, even if they 
had remained in the criminal process, from being given state prison sentences. 
Many crimes that are particularly easy for people with untreated mental illness to 
fall into, like small-scale drug trafficking and burglary, are crimes where mass 
incarceration has tipped the scales decisively in favor of incarceration in state 
prison. See TORREY, supra note 29, at 39–53 (describing both deinstitutionaliza-
tion and increasing imprisonment of mentally ill in California) 
 91 See MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (David 
Garland ed., 2001); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
28–29 (2006). 
 92 See Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 848, 849 (1983). 
 93 This is sometimes discussed as the “foundationalist” approach to dignity. 
See Luban, supra note 87 (noting that foundationalism recognizes that human 
rights are universal and can be codified). For an example of such a foundationalist 
classic, see Gewirth, supra note 83, at 11 (noting the relationship between dignity 
and inherent human rights). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Luban, supra note 87, at 20. 
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the pragmatist reverses the order of explanation, de-
fining ‘human dignity’ by its inferential commit-
ments rather than the other way around.96 
A. Five Cluster Approach to the History of Dignity 
Taking a historical approach can help make sense of what seems 
to be a plethora of meanings, even within the narrow lens of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s use of the term. In a recent analysis of the Court’s 
treatment of dignity, Professor Leslie Henry identifies five core 
meanings that continue to have some relevance in contemporary law 
and that share overlapping features.97 However, no single set of fac-
tors describes all of them.98 Henry’s five clusters are: “institutional 
status as dignity,” “equality as dignity,” “liberty as dignity,” “per-
sonal integrity as dignity,” and “collective virtue as dignity.”99 De-
spite dignity having ongoing relevance in the contemporary period, 
his analysis suggests there is also a temporal sequence.100 When 
viewed historically, these clusters suggest there can be considerable 
reach, but also precision and limits to using dignity to shape consti-
tutional doctrine.101 
1. INSTITUTIONAL STATUS AS DIGNITY 
For much of the period between the Revolution and the middle 
of the twentieth century, dignity was confined largely to the first 
category: institutional status as dignity.102 By the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution, the United States renounced the power to 
ennoble an aristocracy, but shifted that hierarchical sense of dignity 
to the state itself and its officials.103 For much of the next century 
and a half, dignity figured into case law mostly as a property of gov-
ernment, especially states and courts.104 This began to change in the 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. 
 97 Henry, supra note 77, at 188–90 (“Dignity is not a fixed category, but ra-
ther a series of meanings that share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance.”). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 189–90. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 188–90. 
 102 Id. at 190, 193. 
 103 Id. at 193–94. 
 104 Id. 
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twentieth century and accelerated significantly after World War 
II.105 
This first phase of the modern emergence of dignity as a strong 
source of individual rights took place against the background of the 
Holocaust in Europe, the exposure of the crimes of Stalinism in the 
Soviet Union, and Jim Crow racism in the southern United States. 
These themes echo throughout the jurisprudence. Internationally, 
this first dignity wave produced the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights in 1948.106 In Europe, it gave rise to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights in 1950.107 The dignity that emerged in 
American Constitutional law around this same time was not always 
explicitly raised. Rather, it was expressed in more canonical consti-
tutional words and phrases, like “due process,” “liberty,” and 
“equality.”108 In Miranda v. Arizona,109 one can find a strong exam-
ple of the Court’s view of dignity as a larger value underlying many 
of the particular protections for the criminal suspect: 
“All these policies [regarding the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation] point to one overriding thought: . . . the respect a govern-
ment—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of 
its citizens.”110 
Another key expression of this dignity pulse (although, again, 
often implicit) was in the jurisprudence of the Warren Court, begin-
ning with Brown v. Board of Education.111 
                                                                                                             
 105 Id. at 178. 
 106 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 2 
(2010) (discussing context in which UDHR was framed). 
 107 Id. at 191. 
 108 Examples of due process cases include the following major criminal pro-
cedure decisions: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51, 55 (1961); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759 
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 109 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 110 Id. at 460. 
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2015] DIGNIFYING MADNESS 27 
 
2. DIGNITY AS EQUALITY 
Dignity as equality is a theme that finds expression as early as 
the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims that “all men are 
created equal.”112 In the Constitution, there is a ban on all “title[s] 
of nobility.”113 This feature stems directly from the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and its premise that the common bond of divine creation 
trumps all forms of worldly status.114 The Fourteenth Amendment 
gives equality direct expression in its promise of Equal Protection 
under state law (and, which the Court has found, binds federal law 
as well through the Fifth Amendment).115 While equality can be 
conceived as a problem of formal comparisons between specified 
groups or individuals,116 the Supreme Court has frequently ex-
pressed a concern with how the government treats its citizens based 
on their status. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,117 where the 
Court held that laws criminalizing marriage between persons of dif-
ferent racial backgrounds were unconstitutional, the Court stated: 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis 
as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifica-
tions so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law.118 
The Court has also affirmed equal protection of the law for cer-
tain vulnerable minority groups, even without a finding of “suspect 
classification” or “fundamental right.”119 Protection is warranted 
                                                                                                             
 112 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
 113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No title of nobility shall be granted by the 
United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any 
title of nobility.”); see Henry, supra note 77, at 200 (quoting uses of dignity by 
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton). 
 114 Jacobson, supra note 79, at 293. 
 115 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). 
 116 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (discussing equal pro-
tection and enforcement of the laws “among those engaged in the same business”). 
 117 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 118 Id. at 12. 
 119 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435–36; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
635 (1996) (holding that gays and lesbians are protected under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
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where the law or classification in question expresses hostility toward 
a group that is incompatible with the state’s responsibility toward 
the dignity of its citizens.120 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center,121 the Court extended protections to regulations that nega-
tively classified the intellectually disabled in terms that unusually 
invoked dignity explicitly: 
For the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has 
changed in recent years, but much remains the same; out-dated stat-
utes are still on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable 
to the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the retarded, con-
tinue to stymie recognition of the dignity and individuality of re-
tarded people.122 
In Romer v. Evans,123 the Court overturned a Colorado initiative 
that banned municipalities from enacting gay rights protections in 
terms that invoke this proper respect for the citizen, stating: 
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this 
sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Con-
stitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that govern-
ment and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who 
seek its assistance.124 
3. LIBERTY AS DIGNITY 
Liberty is also a key feature of the high court’s post-World War 
II dignity jurisprudence. Concern for dignity as liberty runs through 
the Warren Court’s decisions on free speech125 and many criminal 
                                                                                                             
 120 Id. 
 121 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 122 Id. at 467. 
 123 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that gays and lesbians are protected un-
der the Equal Protection Clause). _ 
 124 Id. at 633. 
 125 Henry, supra note 77, at 173 (noting the importance of free expression (cit-
ing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971))). The Fourth Amendment’s right 
to be free from unreasonable seizures was applied to even brief street encounters. 
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). In Terry, the Court does not explicitly 
use the term “dignity,” but it is clearly concerned with the indignity of being sub-
jected to even a brief interference with one’s business. See id. 
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procedure decisions, but finds its strongest expression in the right to 
privacy— culminating in the right to abortion.126 
4. PERSONAL INTEGRITY AS DIGNITY 
Much of this first dignity wave in US constitutional law took 
place from the 1950s through the 1970s in the Warren Court and the 
first part of the Burger Court.127 During the Rehnquist Court, this 
modest dignity trend went into a “period of hibernation” in the 
1980s and 1990s.128 During this period, state interests and adminis-
trative discretion increasingly trumped concerns about human dig-
nity.129 It is tempting to attribute the waning of the first phase to the 
Court’s rightward trend under the increasingly conservative ap-
pointments of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The sec-
ond wave, however, that is emerging today during the Roberts Court 
has come when the Court is no less conservative. Indeed, some of 
the most important “dignity opinions” have come from the Court’s 
conservative majority.130 
                                                                                                             
 126 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause ensures that married and unmarried individuals will be 
treated alike concerning contraceptive use); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (relating the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy, and personal 
liberty to a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion); Thornburgh v. Am. 
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (finding the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act unconstitutional based on principles of lib-
erty). 
 127 The Warren Court’s dignity jurisprudence has already been discussed. See 
supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfin-
ished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 9 (1970). Perhaps the 
strongest dignity opinion of the era took place after Justice Warren was replaced 
by the more conservative Chief Justice Warren Burger. The most important ex-
ample is Furman v. Georgia, which uses the word “dignity” no less than twenty 
times. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 128 Henry, supra note 77, at 171–72. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id.; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (upholding the fed-
eral law Partial-Birth Abortions Ban Act of 2003, which was intended to “ex-
press[] respect for the dignity of human life”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
594 (2006) (explaining that the “knock-and-announce” rule protects an individ-
ual’s privacy and dignity by giving the person an opportunity to “collect oneself” 
before the police enter). 
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Instead, the shift since the 1990s is one in emphasis. The key 
decisions of the early period, mostly in criminal procedure, high-
lighted the equality and especially the liberty aspects of respect for 
human dignity.131 This came into direct conflict with the massive 
expansion in aggressive policing and prosecution associated with 
the war on crime and drugs and mass incarceration.132 The renewal 
of dignity taking place in recent cases emphasizes a very different 
aspect, which Professor Henry describes as “personal integrity as 
dignity.”133 This invokes very different practical demands on the 
state. Whereas liberty or even equality mostly call for negative 
rights, or forbearance of state intervention, dignity as integrity at-
tends to one’s lived experience and the physical and social relations 
necessary to sustain the human body and a human life. Dignity as 
integrity highlights “people who become vulnerable to their circum-
stances, express unharnessed appetites, and expose their bodily na-
kedness or mental fragility.”134 
In recent cases, the Court has revitalized some traditional limits 
on state power. For example, in Hudson v. Michigan,135 Justice 
Scalia explained the constitutional significance of the common law 
“knock-and-announce” rule, which protects individual dignity by af-
fording “the opportunity to collect oneself before answering the 
door.”136 
                                                                                                             
 131 See cases cited supra note 108. 
 132 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 130–31 (2007) (describing the response of the judicial system to the war on 
crime). 
 133 Henry, supra note 77, at 215. This line of thought has origins in classical 
thought: Aristotle’s virtue ethics. See Id. “Personal integrity as dignity” is also 
expounded upon by contemporary philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum. See 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 159–60 (2006) (writing that the “capabilities approach sees 
the world as containing many different types of animal dignity, all of which de-
serve respect and even awe”). 
 134 Henry, supra note 77, at 212. 
 135 547 U.S_586 (2006). 
 136 The rule, which has its origins in the common law of England, requires the 
police to signal their presence and intent to enter before forcing the entry. Hudson, 
547 U.S. at 588, 594. The delay required is very brief and is expressly not a suf-
ficient amount of time for a resident to escape or destroy evidence of a crime. See 
id. Although the Court in Hudson ultimately refused to suppress evidence gather 
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This notion of dignity has also been visible in a series of Eighth 
Amendment decisions in which the Court has ruled out certain pun-
ishments by instituting bans on sentencing juveniles to death137 or 
life imprisonment without parole for a non-homicide crime.138 Per-
haps the most significant recent invocation of this notion of dignity 
as decency is the above-referenced Brown v. Plata decision, which 
found that California’s chronically overcrowded and medically un-
der-resourced prisons had created a risk of suffering equivalent to 
torture—one which was “incompatible with the concept of human 
dignity and has no place in civilized society.”139 
5. COLLECTIVE VIRTUE AS DIGNITY 
The pairing of “human dignity” and “civilized society” (and in 
other instances “a decent society”) suggests that states may have dis-
tinct responsibilities and concurrent powers that extend beyond 
those that have historically provided the legal foundations for civil 
commitment.140 In Gonzales v. Carhart,141 the Supreme Court up-
held the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which banned cer-
tain methods of performing late-term abortions.142 After describing 
                                                                                                             
in violations of this rule, it did reaffirm its constitutional status as part of the 
Fourth Amendment requirements of a reasonable search. See id. The expression 
“collect oneself” is an almost poetic invocation of dignity as personal integrity, 
and it beautifully reminds us how much this depends on both belongings and so-
cial arrangements or norms. 
 137 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 138 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 139 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
 140 See Henry, supra note 77, at 222–23. 
 141 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). There is a clear parallel between the Court’s 
invocation of decency and civilization in the Eighth Amendment cases like Brown 
v. Plata and their deployment in Gonzales v. Carhart, even though the Court split 
in very different directions. Both share a focus on the dignitary treatment of the 
human body, complete with gory descriptions of medical procedures in Gonzales 
and photographs evocative of great human suffering in Brown. See id. at 135–40; 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–27. Unlike the much controverted “regret” aspect of 
Gonzales, the dignitary interest in barring certain atrocious uses of human bodies 
seems to rest on a more objective foundation. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60. 
The pairing of Gonzales and Brown suggests that both the left and the right of the 
Court are responsive to the personal integrity and collective virtue aspects of the 
new dignity jurisprudence. 
 142 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012). 
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the physical nature of these methods and the difficulty of differenti-
ating them from acts of deliberately killing a newborn infant, the 
Court held that Congress could constitutionally bar these methods 
as incompatible with “respect for the dignity of human life.”143 One 
does not have to agree with the Court’s outcome or specific reason-
ing in Gonzales to see something promising in its recognition that 
state power exists beyond the narrow confines of parens patriae and 
police power to protect the community’s interest in common human 
dignity, not just on an individual basis, but collectively.144 In many 
respects, this is the flip side of dignity as personal integrity. Con-
versely, an exercise of state power that risks the disintegration of a 
person (and thus the loss of dignity as personal integrity) would ex-
pose the collective or community authority as being indecent, inhu-
man, or uncivilized. 
In the case with the most direct relevance to civil commitment 
law, Indiana v. Edwards, the Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to 
allow a defendant with a serious psychiatric disability (schizophre-
nia) to represent himself in a criminal case.145 This is because self-
representation carries a greater risk than representation through 
counsel that the resulting spectacle will not “affirm the dignity” of 
the individual.146 
B. Dignity-Based Reform 
This shift in the focus of dignity jurisprudence from the mid-
twentieth century to the early twenty-first century may be character-
ized as a second phase of the last reform period when many of the 
                                                                                                             
 143 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–60. 
 144 We think the Court should have struck down the ban despite the state in-
terest in this kind of common decency because of the plaintiff’s very significant 
countervailing dignity interest in controlling her reproductive organs and the long 
history of state and federal governments claiming to protect women against their 
reproductive choices. 
 145 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008). 
 146 Id. at 176. The 7-2 vote in Edwards suggests that a majority of the current 
Court might allow hospitalization to preserve the “dignity as personal integrity” 
of a person with mental illness, caught up in what we have called madness. This 
is a context where conditions like homelessness, self-medication with dangerous 
drugs, and the heavy hand of law enforcement pose an unacceptable risk of irre-
versible disintegration. 
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nation’s laws were amended to protect the liberty and equality of 
people with psychiatric disabilities. 
The cause of this surge in concern for the dignity of people with 
psychiatric disabilities in the 1950s was undoubtedly the exposure 
of mass human rights violations against civilian populations carried 
out by the Nazis and echoed in features of allied conduct as well.147 
Governments in the mid-twentieth century had proven all too will-
ing to detain populations en masse that they deemed dangerous. This 
included the United States, which had detained its Japanese citizens 
and residents. The belief that people with disabilities could be man-
aged to achieve primarily social hygiene goals was disturbingly 
close to the genocidal impulses of Third Reich social policy. 
The concerns regarding dignity as respect for personal freedom 
or autonomy have not so much faded, as they have joined with con-
cerns over the threat to dignity posed by incarceration in jails and 
prisons lacking treatment or individualized assessment. These con-
cerns cannot simply be collapsed into the earlier ones. Respect for 
autonomy could well justify incarcerating psychiatrically disabled 
and vulnerable people whose conduct is felonious meets the legal 
definition of a felony. Dignity reflected in the fragility of human 
integrity, and in the regard a “decent society” has for that fragility, 
can complete the reforms of almost a half century ago. 
We believe that three core principles can provide guidance for 
revising the reformed statutes of the 1970s: (1) the principle of nar-
rative autonomy;148 (2) the principle of minimization of incarcera-
tion;149 and (3) the principle of progressivity.150 Each of these, as we 
shall now attempt to show, protects the interests of psychiatrically 
disabled people in equality of civic standing and autonomy, but with 
a commitment to personal integrity and collective virtue that was 
left out of the 1970s reform argument. 
1. NARRATIVE AUTONOMY 
Dignity has been associated with the autonomy of the individual 
at least since the influential work of German philosopher Immanuel 
                                                                                                             
 147 BROWN, supra note 19, at 7. 
 148 See infra III.B.1 Narrative Autonomy. 
 149 See infra III.B.2 Minimizing Incarceration. 
 150 See infra III.B.3 Principles of Progressivity. 
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Kant in the late eighteenth century.151 Narrative autonomy can be 
honored even when there are good reasons for limiting liberty of 
action and decision-making, e.g., if a person is imprisoned for a 
crime.  It can also be honored even when equality is denied, e.g., a 
child or a subordinate in a formal organizational hierarchy. 
The late Ronald Dworkin provided one of the most influential 
accounts of this aspect of dignity.152 Dworkin argues that individu-
als have an interest in being treated with respect, even when they 
have justifiably been relieved of decisional autonomy or no longer 
have a meaningful capacity for decisional autonomy.153 He writes: 
“[I]f his choices and demands, no matter how firmly expressed, sys-
tematically or randomly contradict one another, reflecting no coher-
ent sense of self and no discernable even short-term aims, then he 
has presumably lost the capacity that it is the point of autonomy to 
protect.”154 But, the departure of agency does not change the signif-
icance of dignity in guiding how that person should be treated. As 
Dworkin notes, “A person’s right to be treated with dignity . . . is 
the right that others acknowledge his genuine critical interests: that 
they acknowledge that he is the kind of creature, and has the moral 
standing, such that it is intrinsically, objectively important how his 
life goes.”155 
Legal philosopher David Luban describes this aspect of dignity 
as honoring a person’s “being” rather than her “willing”: 
Honoring someone’s human dignity means honoring 
their being, not merely their willing. Their being 
transcends the choices they make. It includes the way 
they experience the world—their perceptions, their 
passions and sufferings, their reflections, their rela-
tionships and commitments, what they care about.156 
                                                                                                             
 151 KANT, supra note 88, at 43. 
 152 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 233–37 (1993). 
 153 Id. at 225. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 236. 
 156 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 76 (2007). 
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Even as it succeeds in achieving the liberty of the person, current 
law fails to obtain respect for dignity in the sense of narrative auton-
omy. For those in situations of madness, assailed not only by symp-
toms, but also by homelessness, victimization, and/or incarceration, 
autonomy as liberty is often an empty autonomy. In contrast, a 
growing body of research suggests that narrative autonomy remains 
important to people in legal proceedings.157 
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Narrative Autonomy 
The idea that facilities should respect the narrative autonomy of 
a person with psychiatric disabilities undergoing coerced treatment 
is supported by empirical research. Researchers in the MacArthur 
studies on outcomes in psychiatric interventions found that, inde-
pendent of the decision to commit, the person’s subjective sense of 
coercion was lessened with “the degree of respect with which the 
treatment provider dealt with the patient.”158 From this perspective, 
a full civil commitment hearing is an opportunity to provide the sub-
jects with an opportunity to be heard. By telling their story to a 
judge, a figure of both real and symbolic authority, individuals un-
dergoing stressful symptoms and circumstances receive respect be-
fore the law and powerful reinforcement of their essential dignity.159 
Empirical research confirms this result, even when the subjects in 
question believe “what they say is having little or no influence over 
the third-party authority.”160 Professor Tom Tyler and his colleagues 
                                                                                                             
 157 See Mark R. Munetz et al., Mental Health Court and Assisted Outpatient 
Treatment: Perceived Coercion, Procedural Justice, and Program Impact, 65 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 352, 357 (2014) (concluding that mental health courts 
achieve less coercion, more procedural justice, and more satisfaction because 
judges treat subjects with respect and listen to them); Sarah Kopelovich et al., 
Procedural Justice in Mental Health Courts: Judicial Practices, Participant Per-
ceptions, and Outcomes Related to Mental Health Recovery, 36 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 113, 118 (2013) (finding procedural justice correlated with fewer 
symptoms and more satisfaction). 
 158 WINICK, supra note 9, at 25. Professor Winick goes on to explain that 
“those subjected to psychiatric hospitalization against their will may suffer a se-
rious loss of dignity and of self-esteem and self-efficacy.” Id. at 47. 
 159 Id. at 147–48. 
 160 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: 
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 440 (1992). 
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found, across a variety of legal proceedings (including civil commit-
ment), that the perception of the legitimacy of the resulting incarcer-
ation is increased by “the extent to which the patient was afforded 
an opportunity to express his or her opinion on the admission deci-
sion [and] . . . the extent to which what the patient had to say was 
taken seriously.”161 
Voice is one of several dignity-enhancing elements that proce-
dures can either assure or ignore. Others include whether (1) the de-
cision maker appears neutral, (2) the individual who is subject to 
confinement is permitted to participate meaningfully, and (3) the in-
dividual is treated by the authorities in a manner worthy of dignity 
and trust.162 The evidence is consistent and strong that these proce-
dural features create a positive feeling toward the individual’s en-
counter with the law, even where the procedural outcome goes 
against the subject’s stated wishes.163 A procedure that communi-
cates respect for the subject and his dignity may be especially im-
portant for those with mental illness, who often “already have been 
marginalized and stigmatized by a variety of social mecha-
nisms . . . .”164 
b. International Human Rights Law and Narrative 
Autonomy 
International human rights treaties, declarations, and develop-
ments in human rights law also reflect a growing parallel concern 
with narrative autonomy, directly linked to the legal value of con-
serving human dignity. These include key documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);165 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);166 International 
                                                                                                             
 161 See WINICK, supra note 9, at 25 (first citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. 
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26–34 (1988); then 
citing TOM R. TYLER AND YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002)). 
 162 Tyler, supra note 160, at 439–41. 
 163 Id. at 436–37. 
 164 WINICK, supra note 9, at 146. 
 165 “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalien-
able rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, jus-
tice and peace in the world . . . .” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 166 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble, art. 10, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);167 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties (UNCPD);168 and regional treaties.169 This concern is also ref-
erenced in the German constitution,170 in the South African consti-
tution,171 and in the jurisprudence of many national supreme 
courts.172 
                                                                                                             
 167 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pream-
ble, art. 13, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 168 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signa-
ture May 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter 
CRPD]. The Convention’s Preamble begins with “[r]espect for inherent dignity,” 
which is listed along with “individual autonomy” and “independence of persons.” 
Id. at art. 3(a) (suggesting that dignity means something more than autonomy). 
 169 Although surprisingly not the preamble to the most elaborate of all treaties 
or regional charters, the language of the European Convention on Human Rights 
is nearly identical in most of its substantive provisions to other documents, seem-
ing to adopt dignity by implication, and the preamble to the convention does cite 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is also clearly the source of 
many of its substantive provisions. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 5, 52, http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf (last vis-
ited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter ECHR]. However, the word “dignity” only enters 
the text of the European Convention with Optional Protocol No. 13 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concern-
ing abolition of the death penalty, which was promulgated in 2002. The protocol 
preamble begins: “[c]onvinced that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a 
democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the 
protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all 
human beings. . . .” Id. at 52. 
Also, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which took ef-
fect in 2009, contains an entire chapter devoted to dignity. See EUROPEAN UNION 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ch. 1, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/char-
ter/pdf/text_en.pdf, ch. 1 (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter EUCFR]. 
 170 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] [Constitution] (Ger.), translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/. 
 171 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 172 See Oliver Lepsius, Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft, 7 GER. 
L.J. 761, 763–64 (2006) (recognizing that the German Federal Constitutional 
Court held that a law permitting the shooting down of an airplane carrying inno-
cent passengers in terrorist attack situations violated the guarantee of human dig-
nity); Ariel L. Bendor & Michael Sachs, The Constitutional Status of Human Dig-
nity in Germany and Israel, 44 ISR. L.R. 25, 29 (2011) (noting that Israel’s Su-
preme Court, in Katalan v. Prison Services, held that “prison walls do not bar the 
prisoner from human dignity”); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at 2–4 (S. Afr.) (holding that 
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The UNCPD preamble begins with “[r]espect for inherent dig-
nity,” which is proclaimed along with “individual autonomy” and 
“independence of persons.”173 It is this aspect of dignity that also 
informs the sweeping opening lines of the UDHR preamble: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”174 It is restated 
in the Declaration’s very first article.175 This general promise of dig-
nity is a key feature of the opening articles of the ICCPR,176 the 
ICESCR,177 and regional treaties.178 While these broad principles 
create a “common standard” for human rights, they have had “min-
imal direct application to the rights of persons with mental disabili-
ties.”179 
A second strand of meaning concerns the specific rights of indi-
viduals that comprise the elements of a dignified life. Abrogation of 
these rights would constitute a negation of the general promise of 
dignity. This strand is most evident in the political and civil rights 
enumerated in the UDHR and subsequent human rights treaties. 
                                                                                                             
laws prohibiting sodomy violate the constitutional right to human dignity); Kin-
dler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 781 (Can.) (finding that capital punishment 
could constitute a serious violation of human dignity). 
 173 CRPD, supra note 168, at art. 3(a) (suggesting that dignity means some-
thing more than autonomy). 
 174 UDHR, supra note 165. 
 175 Id. at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood.”). 
 176 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble, art. 10, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 177 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pream-
ble, art. 13, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 178 Surprisingly, this principle is not in the preamble to the most elaborate of 
all regional charters, the European Union’s Human Rights charter. See ECHR, 
supra note 169. This omission has been corrected in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, which took binding effect in 2009 and contains an 
entire chapter devoted to dignity. See id.; see also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and 
American Convention on Human Rights (1948), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/declaration.asp. 
 179 Gostin & Gable, supra note 89, at 33. 
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These include the rights to assembly, speech, and political partici-
pation, either directly or through representatives in government.180 
From the perspective of people with mental illness and the govern-
ment of madness, it is striking that these provisions reflect great con-
fidence in the state to carry out interventions based on welfare and 
policing without risk to dignity. 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and article 3 of its more 
comprehensive regional counterpart, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), declare that “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”181 
Consistent with Article 5, detention for the purpose of appropriate 
medical treatment does not violate Article 3.182  Moreover, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights has held that the potential for abuse 
is so great in involuntary commitment that courts must carefully 
consider the individual circumstances of confined persons to deter-
mine whether that detention has become “inhuman or degrading.”183 
A similar balance has been struck by the United Nations General 
Assembly which, in 1991, adopted Resolution 46/119 titled “[t]he 
protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care.”184 This resolution places dignity as the second 
                                                                                                             
 180 UDHR, supra note 165, at arts. 18–21. 
 181 The U.N. Declaration includes the word “cruel” as well, providing in full, 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.” See UDHR, supra note 165, at art. 5. 
 182 “As a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be 
regarded as inhuman or degrading.” Herczegfalvy v. Austria, App. No. 10533/83, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992); see also Philip Fennell, Doctor Knows Best? Thereapeutic 
Detention Under Common Law, the Mental Health Act, and the European Con-
vention, 6 MED. L.R. 322, 324 (1998) (stating “Article 5 allows detention on 
grounds of unsoundness of mind, provided it is carried out in accordance with a 
procedure prescribe by law . . . .”). 
 183 See Herczegfalvy v. Austria, App. No. 10533/83, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992) 
(stating that a position of “inferiority and powerlessness” typical of patients con-
fined in psychiatric hospitals, calls for increased vigilance in reviewing compli-
ance with Convention). The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has also 
adopted a recommendation concerning protection of the human rights and dignity 
of persons with mental disorder. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF 
MINISTERS, Recommendation No. Rec (2004)10, (adopted Sept. 22, 2004), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=775685 [hereinafter Rec (2004)10]. 
 184 G.A Res. 46/119, annex, Principles for the Protection of Persons with Men-
tal Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (Dec. 17, 1991). 
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of its “fundamental freedoms and basic rights,”185 and it includes as 
a guiding principle that the “treatment of every patient shall be di-
rected towards preserving and enhancing personal autonomy.”186 As 
a further condition of involuntary treatment, the Resolution de-
clares: “Where any treatment is authorized without the patient’s in-
formed consent, every effort shall nevertheless be made to inform 
the patient about the nature of the treatment and any possible alter-
natives and to involve the patient as far as practicable in the devel-
opment of the treatment plan.”187 
As with much of human rights law, the resolutions of the U.N. 
General Assembly function as a form of “soft law.”188  They operate 
on a level beneath the broad prefaces and specific clauses of human 
rights treaties in a penumbra of positive norms adopted by member 
governments. Governments may be obliged to adopt these provi-
sions as practice objectives for their own institutions, rather than 
rights that can be easily enforced in court. At that the same, time 
they constitute standards against which institutions—and the gov-
ernments that maintain them—are regularly reviewed by other or-
ganizations, such as the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
Another way soft law can influence hard law is by modeling ap-
proaches that can be adopted in part or in whole by states and sub-
national governments. The European and UN resolutions offer dig-
nity-based models for reforming civil commitment law in the United 
States. As against the LPS reform statutes, this approach stands out 
in three ways and each approach is connected to a different way in 
which madness challenges dignity. First, the human-rights approach 
suggests a basis for intervention that is more care-oriented than the 
violence-prevention ethic embodied in the dangerousness standard. 
                                                                                                             
 185 Id. at Principle 1 (“All persons with a mental illness, or who are being 
treated as such persons, shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person.”). 
 186 Id. at Principle 11. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See generally David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law 
in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordina-
tion, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005) (discussing the way guidelines work with more bind-
ing forms of law to achieve coordination in Europe with a focus on labor and 
employment rights). 
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Waiting for treatment until persons are deemed a danger of violence 
to themselves or others is a denial of human dignity. 
Second, the human-rights approach insists that intervention be 
the least intrusive or restrictive. The 1970s reform era put too much 
emphasis on the in-and-out decision about hospitalization and not 
enough on providing the best balance of liberty and care that is 
achievable. This has led to campaigns for assisted outpatient treat-
ment laws as a supplement to civil commitment in some states. The 
human-rights approach eliminates the need for a separate legal 
standard by insisting that treatment always be in the “least intrusive” 
or “least restrictive” setting possible. 
Third, the human-rights approach makes it imperative that au-
thorities consult with persons subject to mandatory treatment and 
take their participation into consideration, both in the design of an 
individualized treatment program and in prioritizing convergence 
with the subject’s preferences at the earliest possible point. 
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities who are coerced into 
treatment are in an inescapably undignified position. When confined 
and forced to take mind-altering chemicals, their autonomy over 
their physical and mental world is violated in a profound way. How-
ever, this violation of autonomy is not identical to a violation of dig-
nity. Involuntarily committed individuals can be shown respect. 
They can be listened to. They can develop meaningful relationships 
with their caretakers and can become invested in, and proud of, their 
progress.189 However, as research on consumer law shows, legal 
rights do not always translate into meaningful voices.190 
2. MINIMIZING INCARCERATION 
Throughout this article, we have used the term “incarceration” 
to refer to both psychiatric hospitalization and imprisonment. But, 
whatever its intentions, and however promising its resources for 
treatment, detention in a hospital or prison poses inevitable risks to 
                                                                                                             
 189 One common way to frame the importance of dignity for mentally ill indi-
viduals receiving treatment is to refer to them as consumers or survivors, instead 
of patients. But, as noted above, there are no safe harbors when it comes to dis-
cerning acceptable and appropriate nomenclature. 
 190 See Shauhin A. Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How 
Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of Consumer Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
527, 553–56 (2009). 
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the human dignity of all people, especially those with psychiatric 
disabilities. In this regard, we share with consumer advocates a 
sense that coerced confinement, no matter how well-justified, will 
continue to be problematic for people who can see to their own sur-
vival in the community (parens patriae), and who are not an immi-
nent threat to themselves or others (the police power).191 But, even 
more weight must be given to preventing the pattern by which peo-
ple with chronic psychiatric illness end up incarcerated as punish-
ment. These individuals face severe risk of progressive illness, vic-
timization, and suicide. A dignified approach to civil commitment 
should explicitly seek to minimize the overall amount and depth of 
incarceration that befalls the mad. In the 1970s, that could be done 
simply by limiting hospitalization to those who posed a serious risk 
of doing harm to people, or in some states, to property.192 Since the 
rise of mass imprisonment, that strategy has failed for a staggering 
number of people with psychiatric disabilities.193 
In the 1970s, no one necessarily advocated moving people with 
mental illness into the criminal justice system, nor was it a feared 
outcome. Penal procedures, from police through prisons, had been 
receiving substantial attention from a Supreme Court that appeared 
protective of defendants’ due process rights.194 Criminal justice does 
                                                                                                             
 191 Indeed, this was Professor Winick’s position. See WINICK, supra note 9, at 
47 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence and constitutional considerations thus both sup-
port a narrow scope for involuntary civil commitment.”). 
 192 In the 1980s, for example, some states, like Washington, began to broaden 
their standards for commitment, as concerns about failures of treatment grew in 
the community. See Mary L. Durham & Glenn L. Pierce, Beyond Deinstitutional-
ization: A Commitment Law in Evolution, 33 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
216, 218–19 (1982). 
 193 See TORREY, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.9, at 128 (discuss-
ing large numbers of prisoners with psychiatric disorders). 
 194 Reform of civil commitment followed a decade or more of Supreme Court 
decisions increasing the reach of constitutional rights for criminal defendants. See 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (evidence collected without a warrant 
cannot be used in state court); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) 
(criminal suspects in police custody must be warned of their right to remain silent 
and have a lawyer to advise and accompany them); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
164, 487 (2008) (interrogation must cease once a suspect in custody has asked for 
a lawyer and cannot resume until the lawyer has met with the suspect). None of 
these rights applied to the civil commitment process in the 1970s. Since then, a 
right to a formal hearing and representation by counsel has been clearly estab-
lished. See WINICK, supra note 9, at 141. 
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assure a fuller range of due process rights and greater formal recog-
nition of equality of citizenship between persons with psychiatric 
disabilities and those without. But, in an era of mass incarceration, 
when government has criminalized a broad array of social prob-
lems,195 this practice has become powerfully counter-productive to 
the original goals of protecting civil rights and liberties.196 
Public attitudes about crime and punishment were still in the 
process of hardening into law-and-order populism during the last 
wave of reform.  State statutes remained largely oriented toward re-
habilitation197and the number of incarcerated persons nationwide 
was at or near a twentieth century low. Moreover, the entire prison 
population was a fraction of the size of the total mental health insti-
tutional population.198 However, a decade or two later, popular atti-
tudes and legislative activity had taken a decided turn toward pun-
ishment. Incarceration increased in scale, intensity and length of 
sentence.199 Today, the national imprisonment rate remains near an 
all-time high,200 and the prisons hold many times the number of 
mentally ill people confined in mental hospitals.201 
As noted above, the Supreme Court upheld a sweeping popula-
tion cap on California prisons and, at the same time, let stand a sys-
temic remedy for decades-long deficits in health care.202 While the 
population reduction was intended to make improvements in mental 
health treatment feasible, there is no evidence that prisoners with 
                                                                                                             
 195 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR (2009). 
 196 Simon, supra note 27 (describing inhumane conditions for prisoners with 
psychiatric disabilities in California prisoners). 
 197 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3 (2001) (describing “penal welfarism” as 
the dominant approach to punishment through the 1970s). 
 198 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the De-
institutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 
55–63 (2011). 
 199 GARLAND, supra note 197, at 8–9; Simon, supra note 195, at 18–30. 
 200 U. ALB., HINDELANG CRIM. JUST. RES. CTR., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS TABLE (2009), http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/pdf/t6292009.pdf. 
 201 See TORREY, supra note 22, at 1. 
 202 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–26 (2011). 
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psychiatric disabilities are receiving constitutionally adequate treat-
ment.203 
Trying to repair the prison mental health delivery systems is a 
perverse way to address the inhumanity caused by long-term incar-
ceration of people with serious mental illness. To protect the human 
dignity of people with psychiatric disabilities, civil commitment law 
should require judges to take into account this kind of carceral bal-
ance. A judge must find that the risk of incarceration is serious and 
that hospitalization with treatment and suitable follow-up care 
would reduce the overall length and severity of incarceration.204 
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Minimization of 
Incarceration 
The late Bruce Winnick, the leading proponent of therapeutic 
jurisprudence-based civil commitment reform, opposed both outpa-
tient commitment reforms and expansive changes to parens patriae 
or police power bases for civil commitment.205  His opposition was 
on the ground that coercion was counter-therapeutic and should be 
reserved for those so disabled as to be a threat to their own survival 
or to others.206 He clearly endorsed the principle of narrative auton-
omy. It is noteworthy that Professor Winick, whose therapeutic ju-
risprudence approach to revising civil commitment law has guided 
our own, did not see the major threat of the now widely recognized 
                                                                                                             
 203 In one of his last orders from the bench, Judge Lawrence Karlton denied 
defendants’ motion to dismiss a case related to Brown v. Plata. Coleman v. 
Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2013). He found that “[s]ystemic 
failures persist in the form of inadequate suicide prevention measures, excessive 
administrative segregation of the mentally ill, lack of timely access to adequate 
care, insufficient treatment space and access to beds, and unmet staffing 
needs . . . [T]hese objectively unconstitutional conditions evidence the subjective 
component of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 989. 
 204 In practice, combined with the principle of narrative autonomy, this should 
result in something very much like the combination of services and outpatient 
treatment mandated by current reforms like Kendra’s Law in New York or 
Laura’s Law in California. See sources cited supra note 71. 
 205 See generally WINICK, supra note 9, at 6–11 (outlining elements for the 
“Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model of Civil Commitment” explored throughout 
the book). 
 206 See generally id. 
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mass imprisonment of people with psychiatric disabilities.207 At the 
same time, it is difficult to imagine that he would have been com-
placent about the mass-incarceration of people with mental illness 
and psychiatric disorders.208 
Today, no one on any side of the debate about the hospitalization 
of people with mental illness can ignore the striking number of per-
sons with psychiatric disabilities ending up in penal institutions and 
sometimes in the harshest possible versions.209 As a result of poli-
cies aimed at increasing the overall flow of troubled citizens to pris-
ons, there has been a gradual, but now severe, accumulation of per-
sons with psychiatric disabilities inside the nation’s supersized 
prison systems.210 
3. PROGRESSIVITY 
Incarceration is always a powerful challenge to human dignity, 
especially when the imprisoned person has a serious psychiatric dis-
ability. Any civil commitment system anchored in human dignity 
will seek to assure that every authorized incarceration rapidly ad-
vances the person toward emancipation and a stable life in the com-
munity, while honoring the subject’s treatment preferences as much 
                                                                                                             
 207 His major treatise on the topic fails to even discuss incarceration. See gen-
erally id. 
 208 Indeed, Professor Winick’s pioneering work promoting drug courts was 
powerfully motivated by a desire to reduce over-reliance on incarceration. Cf. 
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Juris-
prudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 481 (2002) (discussing drug treatment 
court positively and writing that “sentencing [drug offenders] to prison did not 
change their addictive behavior. Instead, it led to a revolving door effect . . . . An 
important insight of therapeutic jurisprudence is that . . . drug treatment court 
judges consciously view themselves as therapeutic agents”). 
 209 Under pressure from a federal court, California—which keeps the largest 
number of prisoners with psychiatric disabilities incarcerated—recently an-
nounced plans to remove most of their mentally ill prisoners from extreme isola-
tion units, where they have languished for decades, despite a court ruling in the 
1990s banning prisoners with psychiatric disabilities from being housed at one of 
the state’s Security Housing Units at Pelican Bay. See Erica Goode, Federal 
Judge Approves California Plan to Reduce Isolation of Mentally Ill Inmates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/california-plans-
to-reduce-isolation-of-mentally-ill-inmates.html?_r=1. 
 210 See Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the 
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 216 (2013). 
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as possible.211 Where a person requires prolonged hospitalization, 
while waiting for treatment to take effect or due to long-term inca-
pacity, the environment should be the least restrictive and as closely 
linked to normal life in the community as is possible (normaliza-
tion). Reassessments must also take place on a regular and individ-
ualized basis, including the procedural opportunities for narrative 
autonomy noted above. The goal is to protect the future interest in 
the autonomy of the person undergoing any involuntary treatment. 
This is accomplished by reducing the established tendency of incar-
ceration to negatively alter behavior and self-understanding in ways 
that are profoundly anti-therapeutic and that tend to reproduce 
“symptoms” that justify incarceration.212 
Prolonged incarceration in a hospital setting of the sort suffered 
by Mr. Donaldson in O’Connor v. Donaldson213 may no longer be 
the norm. For a portion of people with psychiatric disabilities, hos-
pitalization has been replaced by a pattern of repeated short-term 
detentions for emergency evaluation, sometimes followed by a 
longer term in jail or prison.214 This is not wholly a product of the 
current civil commitment legal standards. A major factor is the scar-
city of appropriate and available psychiatric residential or commu-
nity-based placements.215 Indeed, this is a global phenomenon.216 
                                                                                                             
 211 We take the view that, until scientists better understand treatment appro-
priateness to individual symptoms, a person undergoing a stable agreed-upon 
treatment plan will likely survive in the community without further incarcerations 
(of hospitals or prisons) longer than she would otherwise. That same person will 
likely have an increased subjective sense of well-being. 
 212 Sociological analysis of the role of custodial regimes in creating the behav-
ioral patterns associated with mental illness informed the reforms of the 1970s. 
See APPELBAUM, supra note 47, at 7–9. Especially important was ERVING 
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS 
AND OTHER INMATES (1961). 
 213 422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975) (noting that Donaldson was held against his will 
for nearly fifteen years at the time of his court-ordered release). 
 214 LINDE, supra note 34, at 101–03. 
 215 E. Fuller Torrey et al., The Shortage of Public Hospital Beds for Mentally 
Ill Persons, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/imd/short-
age-hosp-beds.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 216 Jodi Morris et al., Global Mental Health Resources and Services: A WHO 
Survey of 184 Countries, 34 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1 (2012), http://www.publi-
chealthreviews.eu/upload/pdf_files/12/00_Morris.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 
2015). 
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But, the current regime lacks an affirmative obligation to prevent 
incarceration, which is arguably imposed by the constitutional duty 
to respect human dignity. It includes providing services necessary 
to avoid repeated state coercion that is both degrading to the indi-
vidual and costly to the system.217 
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Progressivity 
Most research on therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural jus-
tice focuses on the procedures themselves and on the mental health 
consumer’s satisfaction. There is little investigation of the pattern of 
incarceration or what becomes of the mentally ill individual once 
incarcerated. However, this emphasis on procedure and narrative au-
tonomy is ultimately empty if the outcomes lead only to repeated 
short incarcerations in hospitals or to prolonged incarceration in a 
jail or prison. No matter how empathetically civil commitment pro-
cedures are performed, they will be labeled a sham if they produce 
only coercion without beneficial results. Winick emphasized the ur-
gency to redress the lack of delivery on the state’s promise for mean-
ingful care in the community: 
A therapeutic jurisprudence model of commitment, 
therefore, would keep the unfulfilled promise of de-
institutionalization and provide considerably more 
clinical, social, and housing resources in the commu-
nity for those suffering from mental illness. It would 
emphasize therapeutic needs and preventive ap-
proaches. It would respect patient dignity and auton-
omy when offering help. It would seek to preserve 
liberty and increase therapeutic effectiveness by 
minimizing legal coercion and maximizing patient 
choice.218 
A dignity approach to civil commitment reform would provide 
an affirmative state obligation to follow incarceration with an indi-
vidualized treatment plan developed in collaboration with the person 
subject to civil commitment measures. 
                                                                                                             
 217 The high cost of this cycling pattern is unnecessary to the affirmative obli-
gation, but it makes it far more politically feasible to implement. 
 218 WINICK, supra note 9, at 328. 
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b. International Human Rights and Progressivity 
Both the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities219 (CRPD) and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation No. 
Rec. 10 support progressivity.220 The UN CRPD calls for any nec-
essary treatment to be done “in the least restrictive environment and 
with the least restrictive or intrusive treatment” and to be based on 
“an individually prescribed plan, discussed with the patient, re-
viewed regularly, revised as necessary and provided by [a] qualified 
professional staff.”221 
Article 17 of the Council of Europe’s recommendations com-
bines a legal threshold for intervention. The “significant risk of se-
rious harm to his or her health” standard is considerably more facil-
itative of intervention than that established by most American state 
laws reformed in the 1970s.222 The Article contains a rule requiring 
less restrictive forms of care to be applied where possible (e.g., out-
patient treatment) and a rule that “the opinion of the person con-
cerned” be “taken into consideration.”223 
The entire package is designed to enhance the dignity of the per-
son. Subsequent discussion is structured on the premise that persons 
receiving involuntary care are under a unique challenge to their dig-
nity, both from the effects of illness and the effects of intervention. 
An important corollary is that a system that emphasizes honoring a 
patient’s dignity will benefit the therapeutic process, improve out-
comes, and be a more effective exercise of state power. Each reform 
is conceived to support a more holistic approach to dignifying the 
involuntary care process. This approach balances the patient’s right 
to autonomy within the treatment and confinement process with 
their right to effective treatment and their right to respect.224 
                                                                                                             
 219 CRPD, supra note 168. 
 220 Rec (2004)10, supra note 183. 
 221 G.A. Res. 46/119, supra note 184, at 190. 
 222 Rec (2004)10, supra note 183, at art. 17. Article 17 permits involuntary 
placement only if all five of the following conditions are met: “(i) the person has 
a mental disorder; (ii) the person’s condition represents a significant risk of seri-
ous harm to his or her health or to other persons; (iii) the placement includes a 
therapeutic purpose; (iv) no less restrictive means of providing appropriate care 
are available; [and] (v) the opinion of the person concerned has been taken into 
consideration.” 
 223 Id. at arts. 17–18. 
 224 Id. at explanatory memorandum 16, 75, 85, 91, 93, 142, 169. 
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C. Constitutionality of Dignity Principles 
Would a dignity approach to civil commitment based on these 
three core principles be constitutional? The first and third principles 
are fully consistent with the key constitutional decisions on civil 
commitments because they would not expand the reasons justifying 
incarceration or coerced treatment. The second principle—reducing 
overall incarceration for individuals—raises a more difficult ques-
tion, but also appears to be consistent with existing precedents. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that “a [s]tate can-
not constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual 
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom . . . .”225 The Court 
further found that, “even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury 
or suicide, a person is literally ‘dangerous to himself’ if for physical 
or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of free-
dom . . . .”226 It is unclear if the Court meant “without more” would 
permit involuntary commitment, absent a showing of dangerous-
ness. However, the Court’s broad conception of “danger to self” 
seems to allow substantial room for the development of grave disa-
bility standards that contemplate intervention before acute crisis. 
One of the few instances where states have expanded hospital 
incarceration capacity and civil commitment laws concerns violent 
sexual predators.  Under the laws of twenty states, these defendants 
can be civilly committed after completing their criminal sentence. 
Imprisonment can continue on the grounds that they pose an ongo-
ing risk of sexual offenses due to an underlying disorder and cannot 
fully control their impulses.227 The Supreme Court has upheld these 
laws as consistent with traditional state police power to incapacitate 
people with psychiatric disabilities who pose a threat to themselves 
or others.228 Courts reviewing decisions to hospitalize under our 
                                                                                                             
 225 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 226 Id. at 574 n.9. 
 227 CHRYSANTHI S. LEON, SEX FIENDS, PERVERTS, AND PEDOPHILES: 
UNDERSTANDING SEX CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA 121 (2011). 
 228 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding civil com-
mitment for incapacitative purposes of previously imprisoned sex offenders); 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–12 (2002) (holding that lack of control is a 
necessary finding for civil commitment on incapacitative grounds); United States 
v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010). But see, Karsjens v. Jesson, WL 3755870, 
at * 2 (D. Minn. 2015) (holding that post-sentencing civil commitment is “a pu-
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principle of minimizing incarceration would have to undertake the 
kind of contextual examination of the real risks that face the person 
challenging hospitalization. We concluded above that such an ex-
amination would support the exercise of state power to protect the 
personal integrity and human dignity of that challenger.229 
CONCLUSION: REALIGNING CIVIL COMMITMENT 
There is a growing chorus of those arguing for reform of civil 
commitment laws either on the ground that too many dangerous peo-
ple with psychiatric disabilities are currently ignored by the state 
until it is too late or that successful treatments are available.230 There 
may be merit to these claims, but they echo the claims that have 
preceded every cycle of incarceration for people with psychiatric 
disabilities. We assert here that states should revise their civil com-
mitment laws to place dignity at the heart of their response to per-
sons with mental illness, thereby informing, rather than displacing, 
the traditional police power and parens patriae bases for interven-
tion. Today, we know that replacing one kind of incarceration with 
another that is more punitive, more stigmatizing, and less treatment-
oriented cannot protect human dignity.231 
Our three principles, drawn from therapeutic justice, emerging 
norms in international human rights treaties, and the distinctive, 
compelling context of mass incarceration, are intended to conserve 
and protect human dignity by minimizing incarceration and coer-
cion. The first principle—narrative autonomy—reflects the insight 
                                                                                                             
nitive system that segregates and indefinitely detains a class of potentially dan-
gerous individuals without the safeguards of the criminal justice system.”) While 
Minnesota has the highest number of civilly committed offenders per capita, other 
states are also beginning to question this practice. Monica Davey, States Struggle 
with What to Do with Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/us/states-struggle-with-what-to-do-with-
sex-offenders-after-prison.html?_r=0. 
 229 See supra Section III.B. 
 230 Torrey, supra note 29, at 44 (describing homicides due to untreated mental 
illness), 195-96 (calling for research to determine whether treatments have im-
proved but expressing optimism that successful means for treating those whose 
mental illness threatens violence exists). 
 231 See WINICK, supra note 9, at 47 (explaining that “those subjected to psy-
chiatric hospitalization against their will may suffer a serious loss of dignity”). 
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that coercion is, in substantial part, a matter of procedures. When 
procedures give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words 
are given respect, decisions are explained to them their views taken 
into account, and they substantively feel less coercion. It may not be 
possible to eliminate coercion, but a radical increase in procedural 
justice for people with psychiatric disabilities can push that coercion 
to the minimum level. 
Our second principle—minimizing incarceration—is a direct 
extension of the dignity-as-liberty emphasis of the last wave of re-
forms. Unlike other reform proposals that would change the legal 
definition of harm or incapacity, the minimization of incarceration 
gives courts guidance as to a substantive goal. It is a goal on which 
legal advocacy can be more meaningfully deployed.232 At the same 
time, it is a flexible and realistic standard that requires courts to con-
sider local conditions, law enforcement and incarceration practices 
and the views and understandings of the person facing incarceration 
for treatment. 
The third and final principle—progressivity—is intended to as-
sure that the length of incarceration for people with psychiatric dis-
abilities is minimized and preparedness to return to the community 
is emphasized. The experience of both mass-hospitalization (in the 
middle of the twentieth century) and mass-imprisonment (at the end 
of the century) highlights the danger that separate and potentially 
insulated state bureaucracies will have incentives to develop an in-
stitutional hold on inmates that becomes self-perpetuating.233 
In this essay, we have attempted to define core principles rather 
than draft new statutes. If courts were to adopt these principles as 
guiding norms for the interpretation of existing statutes, the need for 
significant statutory redrafting might be avoided. Moreover, some 
of the more contentious battles between consumer advocates and 
                                                                                                             
 232 Id. at 143 (noting that commitment hearings tend to be brief, non-adversar-
ial episodes). 
 233 Critics today discuss the “prison-industrial complex” to describe these in-
centives toward incarceration. See ANGELA DAVIS, THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX (1999). The same kinds of concerns were raised about the incentives of 
doctors in the large mid-twentieth century public mental hospitals. See BROWN, 
supra note 19. 
52 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
proponents of more assertive treatment would be reframed.234 An 
example of the latter promise is outpatient treatment laws, which 
have been offered as a reform to enable earlier intervention without 
hospitalization.235 Consumer and peer advocates have largely criti-
cized such laws as opening the gate for more coercion, and they have 
suggested that greater voluntary services should be provided with-
out the lever of coercion.236 
The combination of minimizing incarceration and providing 
non-intrusive sustainable treatment in the least restrictive environ-
ment would allow court-ordered outpatient treatment in areas where 
poor social service delivery and aggressive criminalization of peo-
ple with psychiatric disabilities is occurring. This would also avoid 
adding unnecessary coercion in those jurisdictions where adequate 
community-based services and insightful law enforcement ap-
proaches prevail. 
                                                                                                             
 234 For a summary of the support and opposition players and their positions on 
California’s optional outpatient treatment law, AB 1421, see Amy Yannello, Sup-
port Laura’s Law for better mental illness care, SFGATE (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Support-Laura-s-Law-for-bet-
ter-mental-illness-care-5464392.php. 
 235 See TORREY, supra note 29, at 178 (advocating assisted outpatient laws as 
a way to improve treatment). 
 236 The California Association of Mental Health Peer-Run Organizations, for 
example, has opposed expansion and funding of AB 1421 (“Laura’s Law”) on the 
bases that the perceived need for involuntary treatment is based on stigma and 
that coerced treatment undermines the relationship between therapist and client 
and is ineffective. The alternative, according to CAMHPRO, is adequately 
funded, enhanced, voluntary community services. California Association of Men-
tal Health Peer-Run Organizations, CAMHPRO Policy Statement on Involuntary 
Outpatient Commitment; Anne Menasche & Delphine Brody, AB 1421: Involun-
tary Commitment: A Coalition’s Call for Self-Determination, Choice and Dignity 
in Mental Health, http://www.disabil-
ityrightsca.org/OPR/PRAT2012/AB1421.pdf; see Forum with Michael Krasny, 
SF Supervisors Set to Vote on Laura’s Law, KQED NEWS RADIO (July 8, 2014, 
9:00 AM), http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201407080900. 
